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ABSTRACT

In its 2008 Constitution, Ecuador enshrined radically inclusive principles of universal
citizenship and legal protections for migrants, written in a moment of historic Ecuadorian
emigration. Yet in the wake of the Venezuelan migrant crisis and President Lenin Moreno’s shift
towards austerity, how has his administration (2017-2021) responded to the Venezuelan
migration in policy and in political discourse? Through an analysis of legal documents including
ministerial agreements, legislation, executive decrees, and the VERHU visa, this paper outlines a
pattern of legal restrictions levied on Venezuelan migrants. Additionally, this paper employs a
qualitative content analysis of the Moreno administration’s political discourse, including state
actors’ speeches, interviews and tweets discussing Venezuelan migrants. I found that the Moreno
administration uses logics of “control in order to protect” in justifying legal restriction to
Venezuelan migrants’ entry to Ecuador, and in public discourse, the state frames Venezuelan
migrants as victims of a despotic Maduro regime and recipients of Ecuadorian benevolence, thus
constructing Ecuador as a ‘humanitarian state’ in public imagination. When there are points of
divergence from this characterization of vulnerable migrants in moments of violence, actors
employ criminalizing language but preserve a distinction for an ‘innocent’ Venezuelan migrant,
too. Through a migration management perspective, I conclude that humanitarian rhetoric is
invoked to cloak legal restrictions while maintaining the appearance of Ecuador as a
humanitarian state.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In 2008, Ecuador was the first nation in the world to explicitly include migrants as a
protected class in its progressive new constitution, which delineated the inherent right to migration,
promoted the concept of universal citizenship, and enshrined the same rights for citizens and noncitizens alike. In January 2017, Ecuador’s legislative body passed the Law of Human Mobility
which further promised ideals of universal citizenship and free movement, and broadly defined
forced displacement to the benefit of those fleeing generalized violence. On paper, the state’s
protections are robust.
When I lived in Quito this past academic year, August 2019 to March 2020, an emerging
dynamic clearly challenged these progressive migration ideals. Between 2015 and 2020, more than
1.7 million Venezuelans entered Ecuador, with approximately 377,000 settling in the country; in
2019, approximately 2,000 Venezuelans entered Ecuador each day. International migration
agencies such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimate 5.4 million Venezuelans have left Venezuela as a
result of deep economic, political and social turmoil in the country, with roughly 4 million staying
in the region, walking hundreds of miles along highways with few possessions. In Quito, I
frequently saw buskers with woeful signs and songs about Venezuela crowding stop-lights and
1

bus-stations. Even the kindest members of my host-family blamed everything from the rise in petty
crime to the October 2019 protests on ‘infiltrating’ Venezuelan migrants. For this highly visible,
highly vulnerable population, human rights and universal citizenship seemed to be the last thing
on anyone’s mind.
This research study explores Ecuador’s migration policy in the face of immense
Venezuelan migration, how Venezuelan migrants are constructed in the national narrative, and
how the Lenín Moreno administration (2017-2021) frames both the migrants and themselves as
Ecuadorians. The primary research question is: How has the Moreno administration responded to
the Venezuelan migrant crisis in policy and in political discourse? I break this down into two subquestions: 1) What legal and policy changes have taken place under the Moreno administration
with regard to Venezuelan migration?; 2) How does the political discourse of the Moreno
administration construct Venezuelan migrants in the national imagination?
Ecuador is a particularly interesting case for the study of discourse and policy
implementation because the robust protections contained in the 2008 Constitution and the
governing migration legislation were deeply influenced by the discursive construction of
Ecuadorian migrants in the national imagination. Margheritis (2011) explains that concern for
migrants in the Constitution stems from a particular context for Ecuadorians, for in the era of its
drafting the country was hemorrhaging workers, with up to 20% of the population emigrating to
Spain and the United States in the early 2000s in response to enormous financial crisis and the
dollarization which rendered many families destitute. In this time, new president Rafael Correa
infused migrant issues into his political discourse and promised to be “the migrant’s government,”
constructing and courting a growing diaspora who suffered their own discrimination and precarity
as migrants. In this context, the Constitution included aspirational promises that would encompass
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not only migrants into Ecuador but also send a statement about the treatment warranted for
themselves. In 2017, the Asamblea Nacional, Ecuador’s national legislative body, formally
codified the promises of the constitution with the passage of the Ley de Movilidad Humana, just
as Rafael Correa stepped away and his successor President Lenín Moreno took charge.
In considering the Moreno administration and its goals, some background information is
critical. President Lenín Moreno served as Vice President to Correa between 2007 and 2013,
during which time he was well known for his work investigating the conditions of and developing
social programs for Ecuadorians with disabilities. When he ran in 2016, he was largely seen as the
spiritual successor to the “Citizens’ Revolution” and leftist legacy of Correa. However, after eking
out a narrow victory, Moreno made an abrupt about-turn and distanced himself from the policies
of the former president by publicly denouncing Correa’s actions as oversteps of power, lamenting
enormous public debts, embracing neo-liberal austerity measures and signing an agreement with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and improving relations with the United States. Though
he continued his affiliation with Correa’s party Alianza PAIS, the divide split its members and the
party lost its majority in the Asamblea Nacional. While some scholars praise Moreno’s
administration as a return to liberal democracy, especially its protection of press freedoms (Wolff,
2018; Chiasson-LaBel, 2019), others say his austerity measures mark a definitive end to
Ecuadorian post-neoliberalism. In October of 2019, a sudden end to the national oil subsidy
sparked twelve days of national public transport strikes, spurred indigenous and labor mobilization
and saw state repression of protesters that marred Ecuador’s reputation for respect for human rights
(Ponce et al., 2020). This research study contributes to understanding whether the Moreno
administration’s migration politics reflects a distancing from—or the ongoing validation of—
Correa’s ambitious political rhetoric regarding universal citizenship and the Ecuadorian diaspora.
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Methodology
This thesis contains a literature review followed by two empirical chapters, answering the
questions listed above. In my first empirical chapter, I examine a series of primary source
documents including four ministerial agreements, Presidential Decree 826, filings from the Office
of the Ombudsman, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court’s ruling on the ministerial agreements,
and proposed amendments to the Ley de Movilidad Humana. I gathered these documents from the
official government websites of their respective offices.1 Through them, I have constructed a
timeline that demonstrates a pattern of efforts by the Moreno administration to restrict Venezuelan
entry couched in the language of protection.
In my second empirical chapter, I have conducted a qualitative content analysis of speech
employed by the Moreno administration around Venezuelan migrants and the policies that affect
them. I sought out what van Dijk calls governmental discourse, that is “text and talk of professional
politicians or political institutions,” (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 12). In this case, I included formal
speeches, interviews, and tweets of members of Lenín Moreno and his administration.2
I define “Moreno administration” to include Lenín Moreno, president of Ecuador, and the
ministers most directly related to the shape of policy and law in this respect that began under his
tenure. This includes the following administration leaders: Jose Valencia, Minister of the Ministry

These offices include the Presidencia de la República de Ecuador (https://www.presidencia.gob.ec/); the Ministerio
de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana (https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/); Defensoria del Pueblo
(https://www.dpe.gob.ec/)
2
I chose not to include a systematic survey of official Cancillería, also known as Ministry of Foreign Relations and
Human Mobility, press releases in this project, as Claudia Donoso (2020) recently did so in her article on Ecuador’s
response to Venezuelan migration through a biopolitics lens.
1
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of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (shortened hereafter to MRHMH for its name in Spanish) 3
between June 2018 and July 2020; Luis Gallegos, Minister of the MRHMH July 2020 to present;
and Carlos Alberto Velástegui, Viceminister of Human Mobility from August 2018 to present, and
in charge of press for the visa of humanitarian exception.
Additionally, I have included selected language from María Paula Romo, Minister of the
Interior between August 2018 and November 2020, and Minister of Telecommunications, Andres
Michelena. While these two Ministers do not discuss Venezuelan migrants regularly enough to
warrant a systematic investigation of all their speeches, interviews and tweets, each have made
one-off comments on Venezuelan migrants that are worth examining. As high-level, public-facing
members of the executive branch, their comments contribute to the larger corpus of the Moreno
administration.
In order to access the data, I gathered texts directly from the archive of speeches of the
website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility or the website of the Office of the
President. I searched for and accessed interviews through newspapers, searches on the videostreaming site Youtube, and tweets on social media site Twitter. In my searches on Twitter, I
employed key words such as “migración,” “venezolanos,” “migrantes” “visa de excepción por
razones humanitarias” and “visa VERHU” on the accounts of relevant members of the Moreno
administration. On Youtube, I combined these search terms with the names of aforementioned
administration members, along with “entrevista,” and also watched interviews from the timeframe
of major migration policy changes. Of course, not all of the results were relevant, and I selected
the ones that fit the subject matter of the study. On all platforms, I limited my searches to the period

3

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana; also known as Cancillería, or Chancellery. I use these
interchangeably.
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of the Moreno administration, from 2017, the beginning of his term, to January 2021, the time of
writing.
In all, I draw from nineteen speeches, thirteen interviews, four press statements, and thirtyseven tweets. Once collected, I employed a qualitative content analysis of the texts and determined
repeated themes, imagery, and patterns that characterized Venezuelan migrants in state officials’
public discourse. Upon identifying relevant themes, I coded the documents by breaking up the text
and pulling out key phrases and words that related to the larger theme, logging them in a table with
speaker, date of emission, platform or medium, and context.
All translations included here are my own.

Argument
This thesis argues that the Moreno administration extols its benevolent migration politics
and creates the image of Ecuador as a humanitarian state, while simultaneously restricting
Venezuelans’ mobility through covert bureaucratic and legal means. Throughout 2018 and 2019,
the Moreno administration repeatedly imposed incremental restrictions on Venezuelans’ entry,
always couched in rights-centered language, yet in public text and talk emphasized the victimhood
and precarity of Venezuelan migrants. This created a contradiction between political discourse
framing Venezuelan migrants as weak and victims in need of protection—and the repeated legal
attempts to slow Venezuelan entry. This practice of covert restriction allowed the Moreno
administration to retain political capital based on its perception as a rights-centered state. This
occurred as Moreno turned from the foreign policy of the Correa administration and shifted
towards neoliberal austerity economic policies. This administration discourse created mutually
reinforcing binaries: Venezuelan migrants as victims, and the Ecuadorian state as generous
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protector; and the Maduro regime as authoritarian oppressor. The Moreno administration’s
emphasis on Venezuelans’ rights rather than openly invoking securitization rhetoric affirms what
scholars of Latin America and critical migration studies have identified as a “humanitarian turn.”
My argument relies on the theoretical frameworks of migration management and the
“humanitarian government,” that is, human rights centered language lends legitimacy to the state’s
control and ordering of migrant bodies in the name of protection.

Contribution to Scholarship
Beginning this project, I was interested in Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution with extensive
protections for migrants, lauded as some of the most inclusive legislation in the world for freedom
of movement, and seeing how that framing grew, disappeared or evolved with both the transition
from Rafael Correa to Lenín Moreno and the unprecedented Venezuelan migration. This project
does not seek to provide a comparative analysis of the Correa and Moreno treatments of migrants,
nor does it exhaust the new topics of Venezuelan migrant experience in Ecuador. Instead, I take
up where these scholars left off and analyze some of the same issues such as discursive gaps,
humanitarian framing and control, and migration management in a new era of Ecuadorian
migration policy. This thesis is a descriptive project that explores the language and legal actions
of the Moreno administration, and I do not seek to argue causal relationships, rather present
empirical findings through a particular lens to better understand the Ecuadorian migration policy.
The work adds to current research on the regional response to Venezuelan migration and on
Ecuador’s ‘paradigmatic’ policy gap. Furthermore, at the time of writing, very few scholars
include the VERHU visa in their analysis, with the exception of Jaramillo and Santi (2021), and
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this project’s consideration of migration policy, national narratives in service of the state, and very
recent events in Ecuador adds to existing literature on Ecuador.

Overview of the Thesis
This thesis is developed in five chapters. In my first chapter, I provide an introduction to
Ecuador as a case and to the project as a whole. In my second chapter, I discuss the academic
scholarship that serves as the theoretical basis of my analysis. In my third chapter, I examine the
policy changes, decrees and proposed legislation reform that culminates in the implementation of
the VERHU visa, establishing a pattern of restriction masked with rights-centered language. In my
fourth chapter, I summarize my findings from my qualitative content analysis of the speeches,
tweets and interviews I screened for discourse on Venezuelan migrants, and detail how this
language works to construct Ecuador as a ‘humanitarian state.’ In my fifth chapter, I conclude my
research and note room for future study.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This literature review covers topics of general migration theory, migration management,
regional migration governance, and my contribution to existing scholarship. I include these topics
in order to first consider a broad theoretical conception of migration and what it means for the
state, then lay out the theory of migration management, and finally a summary of what scholars
have said about migration trends as a region, to situate Ecuador alongside its neighbors and its
Latin American context. I also note how this research helps fill gaps that currently exist in this
scholarship.

General Migration Theory

John Torpey, borrowing from Weber’s famous quote on violence, said that modernity is
characterized by the “state monopolization of the legitimate means of movement” (2000). Indeed,
scholars have written about how mobile bodies and immigrants are inherently disruptive to the
metaphorical understanding of the country as the ‘body politic.’ Any outside actor—capable of
‘penetrating’ the borders of the body politic— is associated with a danger to the homogeneity of
the state, questioning a kind of implied dominance merely by being related to another state (Didier
Bigo, 2002). Outsiders, beholden to another state, imaginatively penetrate borders and “question
the fiction of modern sovereignty,” (Agamben, 1997, p. 142).
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Salter (2006) writes about how visa and passport systems allow migrants, who are hyperaware of their status as international bodies, to access temporary membership in a community
through adherence to a ‘confessionary regime.’ This first act of deference to the foreign state
allows migrants to enter their own social contract with the state, where the sovereign determines
political status and the migrant “may claim no rights but is still subject to the law, (pp. 168-171).
Salter’s approach is helpful in thinking about how Ecuadorian bureaucratic governance such as the
requirement of apostilled background checks or certifications of validity for documents are
reflections of the state's power to order migrants.
Neoclassical migration theory provides some insight into the forces of migration. As de
Jong and Fawcett (1981) and Bakewell (2010) point out, migration theory is heavily tied to
concepts of agency, and generally does not offer explanations of forced migration, as those fleeing
political or generalized violence are thought to lack the choices afforded to voluntary or labor
migrants (Bakewell, 2010, p. 1680). There is a rich literature on the dichotomy between migrant
and refugee in national imaginary, national news and media, and migrant jurisprudence, outlining
the fetishization of a perceived “victim” refugee (Clavijo Padilla et al, 2018, p. 26; Kissová, 2017;
Lawlor and Tolley, 2017; Lee and Nerghes, 2018).

Migration Management
My study draws heavily on migration management theory (gobernabilidad migratoria).
Migration management theory is an alternative to security-centered migration policies and
explores how state order-making practices are justified by humanitarian framings (Geiger and
Pécoud, 2010, pp. 8-9).
Many scholars have examined migration management on the supra-national level, studying
the way agencies such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and United Nations
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High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) manage and police migrant bodies using
humanitarian logics. Ashutosh and Mountz (2011) argue that the IOM frames itself as a global
institution of ‘neutral’ cosmopolitan ethics that is on the side of the migrant by using the language
of hospitality and humanitarianism. However, in practice the IOM carries out the punitive and
securitizing work on-behalf of states.
Scholars have written critically about migration management and the role that these
organizations, and states that adopt this framework, play in international migration regimes.
Scholars have argued that the emergence of migration management marks a globalized regime of
control (Domenech, 2017; Duvell, 2002) legitimized through humanitarian language (Fassin,
2010). Indeed, Geiger and Pécoud (2010) observe frequent reference to international human rights
law in the discourse of transnational agencies justifying their initiatives; at the same time,
governments cite their involvement with the IOM and UNHCR to associate themselves with the
“neutrality” of humanitarian language (Bigo, 2002; Ratfisch and Scheel, 2010; Mezzadra and
Neilson, 2013). While frequently discussed in terms of these transnational organizations, states
can also employ the same migration management and humanitarian justifications; it is this state
usage of migration management that this thesis will explore.
Domenech (2013) coined the phrase “control with a human face” to describe the manner
in which the discourse of human rights lends legitimacy to states’ policies of control, including the
use of selective visas, biometric controls, denial of entry, and deportation. In his view, these
policies of control of irregular immigration displace but do not eliminate restrictive means of
control, and do so in order to efficiently control migration flows classified as “desirable and
undesirable,” “ordered and disordered,” (p. 126). Importantly, migration management has the same
goal as openly restrictive policies but are more palatable to public consumption (p. 121). Magliano
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and Clavijo (2011) argue that although this model seeks to distance itself from securitizing
policies, the promotion of an ordered and regularized migration results in all “disorder”
(trafficking, irregular migration) becoming problematized as a security issue to be controlled, yet
within the language of defending human rights. Technologies of migration management depend
on a production of knowledge and “truths” that subjects construct so that “social problems”
become understandable, and therefore governable (De Genova, 2016; Ruiz and Álvarez, 2019, p.
696).
Humanitarianism in migration is another key topic that informs this thesis. Scholars have
used cases in Europe to discuss these intersections of ‘humanitarianism’ and securitization,
particularly around the border regimes of the EU and deaths at sea (Moreno-Lax, 2018; Davitti,
2018; Ojala et al., 2019; Andersson, 2017). Works around these topics in Latin America often
reflect on the IOM or UNHCR, but some scholars examine these dynamics at the state level, such
as Ruiz and Álvarez (2019) who apply many of the considerations of the humanitarian government,
migration management and governmentality to their study of Ecuador’s “war on trafficking,” the
discourse of human trafficking used by the Correa administration.
Ticktin’s work on France’s humanitarian migration policies finds that suffering bodies
must be recognized as “morally legitimate” in order to receive aid under the transnational “regimes
of care:” in this case, deeply ill and sexually abused bodies are deemed worthy of protection, but
laboring or exploited bodies are not (2011, pp. 3-5). Fassin (2005) uses the same humanitarian
migration policies to question Agamben’s separation of the humanitarian and the political, and that
the moral economy of our time has shifted to a combination of policies of order and policies of
suffering. Fassin (2005) spoke of an ever evolving “moral economy” and argued that policies
around “the undesirable” (including not only irregular migrants but the poor, too) would oscillate

12

between sympathy and security. Hollifield (2006) argues that human rights are increasingly a new
legal space in opposition to territorial space in which states have unlimited power.

Regional Migration Governance
Scholarship on Latin American governments’ migration regimes has characterized the
region as distinct from the migration policy evolution of the Global North. While Europe and the
US saw increasing securitization in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks and Europe’s
own ‘migrant crisis’ of the mid-2010s, Latin American nations saw increasing “humanization” of
domestic legislation and interregional efforts such as the Mercosur and UNASUR (Garcia, 2016).
Scholars of Latin America have examined how the region’s migration policies have
subverted the “liberal paradox.” Also known as simply “the policy gap,” the liberal paradox
describes when the liberal state has an economic interest in free movement of labor and goods, but
transnationalism can lead to backlash from the national community and ultimately violate state
sovereignty (Hollifield, 1998; 2004). Some authors understand this paradox as the gap between
what politicians say and what they do with regard to migration (Joppke, 1998; Boswell, 2007).
Migration scholars and political scientists of Latin America increasingly argue, though, that Latin
America has inverted this paradox and trends towards humanitarian border regimes, promising
extreme open borders and freedom of movement while covertly seeking to deny passage (Arcarazo
& Freier, 2015).
Ecuador particularly has garnered attention for its promises of protection, and its policy
shortcomings. Political scientists in the last decade have written on the “quasi-experiment” of
Ecuador’s proclaimed open borders, novel appeals to universal citizenship and transnationalism,
and decriminalization of migration (Góngera-Mera et al., 2014; Ramírez & Olavarria, 2016; Freier
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& Holloway, 2018). Even more abundant are discussions of the discursive gaps between migrants´
framing and realities. Arcarazo and Freier (2015) point out contradictions between the protections
of the 2008 Constitution and the deportation-heavy 1971 migration legislation (now replaced by
the LOMH). Freier et al. (2019) examined the tension between Correa’s rhetoric on migrants and
Cuban migrants’ suffering, arguing that it exemplified discursive gaps inherent in Latin American
immigration policy. Álvarez´s (2020) multi-sited ethnography from 2015-2017 juxtaposes the
claims of “universal citizenship” and mechanisms of illegality, arguing Ecuador was not exempt
from the global neoliberal border control regime even with the left turn.
Ana Margheritis (2011) is cited often for her exploration of the Rafael Correa’s
construction and ‘courting’ of a significant Ecuadorian emigré population; in her paper, she argues
that in linking other platforms of anti-neoliberalism with the plight of migrants, promising to be
“the migrant’s government,” and do away with Global North conceptions of borders and visas, he
personally invoked state-led transnationalism to reinforce his government’s political legitimacy
(p. 206). Góngora Mera et al (2014) attribute the wide- ranging migrants’ protections in the 2008
Constitution to the input of six representatives of expatriate Ecuadorians, on four working groups,
who adopted ideological foundations of human mobility and universal citizenship in order to
champion rights of Ecuadorians abroad rather than migrants within Ecuador, though it was then
extended to encompass them as well, engaging in migrant-identity politics (p. 17). Milier (2012),
too, explains that protections for non-citizens reflected the time in which it was written, but
continues further to explain ways in which Correa eased and restricted asylum application
timeframes and definition of a refugee to suit his foreign policy needs with Colombia.
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My Contribution to Existing Scholarship
Ecuador’s migration policy has been the subject of several studies using it as a case of “the
policy gap,” or breaches between migration discourse and policy (Acosta & Freier, 2015; Vega
Solís, Gómez Martín, & Correa Álvarez, 2016; Feier et al, 2019). However, these examinations of
discourse and immigration policy focus on the Correa administration; there is very little coverage
of the Moreno administration and their rhetoric around Venezuelan migrants, and what does exist
is limited in scope (Bauer, 2019). Donosto’s (2020) critical discourse analysis of press releases
from Ecuador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility is a notable exception, and in
some ways my project is a further exploration of some of the themes she identified. However, her
central framework was Foucauldian biopower, and while very interesting, I seek to take a different
approach. Pugh and Moya (2020), too, offer a comprehensive survey of Venezuelan migrants’
portrayal in Ecuadorian newspaper articles and social media, a valuable contribution to the
literature on Venezuelans migrants in the Ecuadorian public discourse.
This thesis adds to the ongoing research of Venezuelan migrants’ exclusion and reception
in South American countries, an issue that will continue to impact the region for years to come
(Diego Acosta, Cécile Blouin & Luisa Freier, 2019; Leon Rojas, 2020). This thesis combines
original empirical research in the form of discourse analysis and a presentation of this country’s
particular political context, in order to situate the topic’s importance in the broader constitutional
and social history of Ecuador. The thesis’s exploration of what the discursive strategies mean for
the Moreno administration specifically adds to contemporary literature on Ecuador, providing the
first study of Moreno’s migration policy from a migration management perspective. The project’s
larger point is that language around Venezuelan migrants constructs a “humanitarian state” on the
one hand while the administration embraces the surreptitious restriction of entry on the other. This
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case further illustrates the Latin American ‘reverse liberal paradox’ as identified by Acosta and
Freir (2015), and contributes to growing literature on humanitarianism in migration governance.

16

CHAPTER III: LAW AND MIGRATION RESTRICTION

Introduction
In this chapter, I will explore how the Moreno administration since 2018 has put forth
ministerial agreements, released a presidential decree, and submitted amendments to migration
legislation which limit entry and eases the deportation of Venezuelan migrants. An analysis of
these legal documents demonstrates that the administration has sought to: 1) discursively frame
their efforts as humanitarian and rights-based reforms; and 2) to connect this to the theme of
“securitization as integral for rights,” 3) even as these policies impose significant burdens on
Venezuelan movement. This analysis is based on primary source government documents, in their
original Spanish,4 including the four Ministerial Agreements, arguments of the Office of the
Ombudsman before the Constitutional Court, Presidential Decree No. 826, the Ley de Movilidad
Humana, and the proposed amendments to the Ley de Movilidad Humana.

Ministerial Agreements and Legal Challenges
An active period of Venezuelan migration governance began in August 2018 as seen
through a series of ministerial agreements, a declaration of emergency, and policy shifts from the
Ministry of Foreign Relations and Human Mobility. On August 9, 2018, Ecuador’s Ministry of
Foreign Relations and Human Mobility (MREMH5) declared a state of migratory emergency in

4
5

All translations are my own.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana
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three provinces, El Oro, Carchi, and Pichincha,6 citing a report detailing “unusual migration flows”
developed by a slew of other government agencies.7 The declaration enabled the Ministry of the
Interior to send security forces to the aforementioned provinces in order to “maintain operations
and a state of alert in order to immediately carry out required actions; that is, to confront any
negative situation that the unusual migration flow ... could generate.” (MREMH 2018a, Article 3).
This state of emergency was renewed each month until July 2019, when it was expanded to declare
a migratory emergency in the whole country. It was then renewed again continually until March
31, 2020, when a declaration of a sanitary emergency closed Ecuador’s borders and rendered the
migration-based state of emergency moot.8
One week later, on August 16, 2018, the MREMH released a ministerial agreement that
imposed new restrictions upon Venezuelans seeking to enter the country. In keeping with the ‘open
borders’ push of the Correa period, Ecuador allows citizens from all but twenty-four countries9 to
enter the country and receive a 90 day tourist visa, renewable to 180 days, with only a cédula de
identificación, or government issued identification card. Ministerial agreement 000242 changed
that for citizens of Venezuela, mandating that Venezuelans present a passport valid for at least six
months in order to enter. This ministerial agreement cited a report by the Ministry of the Interior
dated that same day (referenced as MDI-DM-S-2018-0006) which invoked the United Nations’

6

El Oro is the region with the largest border crossing into Perú (Huaquillas, Ecuador); Carchi is the region with the
largest border crossing between Colombia and Ecuador (Rumichaca International Bridge), and Pichincha is at the
center and contains Ecuador’s capital, Quito. Resolution No. 000152. (MREMH 2018a)
7
This report, Informe de Motivación de Flujo Migratorio Inusual, was developed by the Cancillería, the Ministry of
the Interior, Secretary of Risk Management, the Ministry of Social and Economic Inclusion, the Ministry of Public
Health, the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, and the Viceminister of Human Mobility. It concluded that
the flow of Venezuelan migrants entering through the northern border had significantly increased in 2018,
particularly after August 1, 2018. (MREMH, 2018a)
8
While interesting, COVID-19’s full effects on migration governance in Ecuador are beyond the scope of this thesis.
9
The excluded countries are predominantly Southeast Asia, the Middle East and African and can be found listed on
this government website: https://www.ministeriodegobierno.gob.ec/requisitos-para-ingresar-a-ecuador/. During the
Correa period, Correa disbanded any visas in June 2008, but required visas of several countries of the Middle East
18 months later (Arcarazo and Freier 2015).
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worry for the situation, and estimated that 3,000 Venezuelan entered Ecuador each day,
increasingly with only an identity card deemed incapable of confirming identity. Backed by the
report from the Ministry of the Interior, the MREMH issued ministerial agreement 000242
reasoning that:
The current migration situation of unusual migration flows of nearly 3000 [Venezuelan
national] entries each day, and the increasing tendency to present only an identification
card, whose authenticity are difficult to verify, have the potential to affect the state’s
capacity to prevent, control and protect from [migration related crime], and could
negatively impact the rights of people in mobility, creating environments for crimes
associated with migration. For this reason, it is necessary to establish policies to prevent
irregular and risky migration.10
This paragraph calls into question the authenticity of cédulas de identificación when they are used
by Venezuelan migrants. Backed by the enormous figures of 3,000 daily entries and the “migratory
state of emergency,” this framing problematizes Venezuelan migration as a risky endeavor that
breeds crime and needs security measures (MREMH 2018b). We see migrants’ rights are invoked,
and icreased restriction and surveillance are emphasized in order to better “control and protect”
crime related to migration, such as human trafficking, mentioned explicitly elsewhere in the
document.
Challenged by the Office of the Ombudsman (or Defensoría del Pueblo), a Quito court
struck down the passport requirement very soon after its implementation (Plazas, 2018), but on
August 22, 2018 it was replaced by another bid to verify Venezuelan identity. Ministerial
agreement 000244 mandated that Venezuelans wishing to enter Ecuador without their cédula

10

“Que a través de informe técnico de situación flujos migratorios inusuales ciudadanos venezolanos de 16 de
agosto de 2018, elaborado por el Ministerio del Interior, en cuya conclusión señala que en la vista de la tendencia
actual de aproximadamente 3000 ingresos por día y la creciente tendencia de ingresar al país únicamente con el
documento nacional de identidad, que no presenta dispositivos de seguridad que permitan comprobar la autenticidad
del mismo o sin ningún documento reconocido por el país, podría impactar negativamente en la capacidad nacional
de prevención, control y protección de estos fenómenos, afectando los derechos de las personas en movilidad, y
generando ambientes propicios para el fomento de delitos asociados a la movilidad humana, por lo que es necesario
se establezcan políticas que permitan prevenir la migración irregular y riesgosa;”
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would have to also present either a) a valid certification of authenticity for their identification card,
emitted by the government of Ecuador or a “recognized regional or international organization,” or
b) a valid certification of authenticity of their cédula emitted by the government of Venezuela, and
apostilled11 (MREMH 2018c). These certifications essentially guarantee that the identification
card has not been altered or tampered with, but brings out the same theoretical and logistical issues
as the passport requirement. Venezuelans in particular are the only nationality of the region that
are asked to present additional verification that their documents are not forged, something
Maldonado et al. (2020) argues inherently criminalizes Venezuelan migrants. Furthermore, the
certificates of validity require investments of additional time and monetary resources that many
Venezuelan migrants do not possess. The Migration Policy Institute reports that though Venezuela
in 2019 tried to implement access to apostilled background checks online, the process is still
incredibly slow, with wait times up to a year to receive a passport for travel (Selee & Bolter, 2020).
Though framed around the security of identification procedures, the new policy in practice sought
to stymie Venezuelan entry through recognized border crossings.
Ministerial Agreement 000244 conflates themes of control and regulation with protection
and the preservation of rights: “the legal system, regulation, protection and control that the Law
requires with respect to human mobility cannot be achieved without also the obligation of
identification … in such a way as to protect [migrants’] rights as well as the rights of the
Ecuadorian host community” (MREMH 2018c). This language reflects what scholars have
identified as “control in order to protect” (Ausserer, 2008; Moreno-Lax, 2018; Ruiz & Álvarez,
2019). The use of security measures, including extended visas and other bureaucratic impositions,

Apostille is “an official certificate from a government that makes a document from one country acceptable in
another, or the system of using such certificates,” Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary and Thesaurus
11
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is justified by the goal of protecting rights. As Agier said (2011, as cited in Ruiz and Álvarez,
2019): “la intervención humanitaria bordea con la vigilancia. No hay cuidado sin control,” (p. 4).12
These “care and control” logics were also present in further entry restrictions in 2019. In
January 2019, just a few days after the infamous femicide perpetrated by a Venezuelan man living
in Ibarra, the Ministry of the Interior and the MREMH released an inter-ministerial agreement
mandating that Venezuelans present an apostilled certificado de antecedentes penales or criminal
background check to enter the country (MREMH & Ministry of the Interior, 2019a). A follow-on
policy (interministerial agreement 000001) carved out some exceptions for children, but once
again, these requirements singled out Venezuelans, implicitly tied Venezuelan nationality to
themes of criminality and threat, and imposed untenable time and cost burdens. These, too, were
swiftly challenged by the Office of the Ombuds, and argued before the Constitutional Court of
Ecuador that they violated principles of equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of birth-place
as outlined in the constitution,13 as well as the principle of “estado de inocencia,” or presumption
of innocence.14 Furthermore, the Ombuds also alleged that the claim that authorities had registered
falsified cédulas contributed to xenophobia and effectively criminalized a whole national
population, and warned against “returning to time periods in which people were criminalized for
their race or social condition,” (Caso N°. 0014-19-IN:4). The Ombuds also argued that these
policies violated the right to migrate and the right to free circulation. 15 On March 27, 2019 the
Constitutional Court accepted the case to be heard on the grounds of constitutionality, and

12

Humanitarian intervention borders on vigilance. There is no care without control.
Article 3, Sections 1 and Article 11 Section 2
14
Article 76, Section 2
15
According to articles 40 and 66 of the Constitution.
13
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provisionally suspended the effects of the Ministerial Agreements; at the time of writing, the case
has yet to be heard or decided (Constitutional Court Case 0014-19-IN).16
While the Constitutional Court has not decided on the constitutionality of these Ministerial
Agreements, their reasoning in the decision to provisionally grant their suspension provides insight
into broader interpretations—from outside the Moreno administration— of the ministerial
agreements and how they conform to or violate the constitution. The tribunal cites three main
points in their suspension:
Considering: (i) the situations of special vulnerability of migrants and their families; (ii)
the risks and dangers to which these groups of people would be exposed by crossing in
hidden routes or to be victims of human trafficking; and (iii) the rejections at the border,
collective de facto deportation and difficulties in entering Ecuador legally, without an
adequate and individualized analysis of the specific needs of protection.17
The Constitutional Court indicates that because of the precarious economic and physical state of
migrants, the identification requirements place an undue burden on Venezuelan migrants, and to
deny them access to regular border crossing would make an already vulnerable population even
more at risk. The Court deems the identity and criminal background check requirements as
equivalent to collective ‘de facto’ deportation. In other words, the background check imposes
administrative barriers that Venezuelan migrants cannot meet and will inhibit their entry in a
systematic way. In practice, this policy will turn away those who may qualify for ‘special
protection’ such as refugee status. Notice that both the ministerial agreements imposing

16

This time gap between case acceptance and its argument and decision is not uncommon in Ecuador. As we will
see later in this chapter, a ruling on a similar mandate took nine years (2008-2017) to be struck down in the
Constitutional Court.
17
Original text from tribunal. Constitutional Court Case 0014-19-IN.
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requirements and the Constitutional Court disbanding them reference human rights reports18 and
the dangers of migrants falling victim to crimes such as trafficking.
A case from the Correa administration highlights how the Constitutional Court rejected a
similar policy with openly securitizing language. The Constitutional Court of Ecuador ruled that
Executive Decree 1471, which levied the requirement of an apostilled background check for one
nationality, Colombian migrants, was unconstitutional because it violated principles of nondiscrimination in Article 11.2 of the Constitution (Sentencia No. 035-17-SIN-CC). However, this
2008 decree contained a radically different tone, openly associating Colombian migrants with
crime and calling for public order and security: “the national security has been gravely affected
due to the invasion,19 principally of Colombians, that enter in part to form criminal associations”
and arguing that it is “the duty of the Ecuadorian state … to attend to public order and the security
of the population…”20 This decree was found to be discriminatory in December 2017, a little less
than a year before the issuance of the Ministerial Agreements discussed above.
The Moreno administration may have learned from the legal battles of the Correa
administration. The MREMH’s legal arguments placed enormous emphasis on the human rights
of migrants, security for the sake of migrants, rather than control. I argue that these MREMH
policies avoid this outright securitizing language in order to preclude being struck down by the
courts.

18

The constitutional court’s decision reference the Resolution 2/18 “Forced Migration of Venezuelans” published
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), as well as a February 2019 press communication of
the IACHR expressing worry at the new measures of managing “forced migrants from Venezuela” and urging them
to protect their rights to seek asylum, to non-devolution and to non-descrimination (Article 9 of case 0014-19-IN).
19
Incursión; can be translated as “invasion” or “attack” in the military sense, or “entrance” or “intrusion”
20
la seguridad nacional se ha visto gravemente afectada debido a la incursión, principalmente de colombianos, que
en algunos casos pasan a formar parte de asociaciones con fines delincuenciales”; “deber del Estado ecuatoriano, a
través de sus instituciones, atender a la seguridad ciudadana y el orden público, y proteger el libre ejercicio de los
derechos y la seguridad de las personas dentro del territorio nacional
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This section shows how the state frames its obligations to migrants’ rights as “securing
their orderly and safe migration,” emphasizing order as a prerequisite for any other rights as
migrants and allowing the state to construct and enforce visions of “safety.” The four ministerial
agreements, though couched in a language of rights protection, imply Venezuelan criminality by
citing the falsification of identity documents and the assumption of criminal histories. The
additional requirements are justified by fears of human trafficking and migration related crime,
and simultaneously systematically limit entry for Venezuelan migrants. Considering the
Constitutional Court’s rejection of essentially the same restriction for Colombian migrants
presented in language of “invasion” and migrants as threats, this restriction is dressed in a
humanitarian language that masks mass exclusion.

Decreto 826 and the Visa de Excepción por Razones Humanitarias (VERHU)
In January 2019, a very public femicide occurred in the northern region of Ibarra, and in
its wake President Lenín Moreno tweeted out a divisive statement to the nation. Part of this
statement read as follows: “I have arranged for the immediate formation of brigades to control the
legal situation of Venezuelan immigrants in the streets, in places of work, and at the borders. We
are analyzing the possibility of creating a special permit to enter the country.”21
This ‘special permit’ was realized five months later. In July 2019, President Moreno
announced Presidential Decree No. 826, an executive order that mandated a new visa for
Venezuelan migrants both inside and outside of Ecuador, the Visa de Excepción por Razones
Humanitarias (VERHU), or Visa of Humanitarian Exception. For Venezuelans inside the country,
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“He dispuesto la conformación inmediata de brigadas para controlar la situación legal de los inmigrantes
venezolanos en las calles, en los lugares de trabajo y en la frontera. Analizamos la posibilidad de crear un permiso
especial de ingreso al país.”
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VERHU provides many benefits: it allows a new path to temporary regularization; the visa itself
is free, and application fees are a mere 50 dollars, considerably lower than what was previously
available; it requires a passport, but accepts them up to five years expired; it forgives previous
fines, although it excludes forgiveness for fines related to working formally or informally under
the tourist visa; it would allow Venezuelans to work legally, which they could not do under the
180 day tourist visa; it would allow regular status for two years; it would give stability where
before they had none. In many ways, the VERHU visa provides a viable path forward that agencies
have called for and criticized the administration for in the past, especially the lack of access to
regularization and ability to stay in the country.
On the other hand, for Venezuelans seeking to enter Ecuador, the visa requirement imposes
a significant, perhaps insurmountable barrier to entry, including and surpassing the securitization
restrictions levied under the rejected Ministerial Agreements. Required interviews for visa-seekers
outside of Ecuador can only be carried out in Carácas, Bogatá or Lima. The VERHU visa is now
a requirement to enter into Ecuador and, along with a passport and an apostilled criminal
background check from the Venezuelan government, stipulates that applicants must never have
broken any Ecuadorian law. Describing his migration policy, Lenín Moreno explained in an
interview that: “We have already exceeded our capacities ...We have decided to solicit a
humanitarian visa that we will provide to our Venezuelan brothers and sisters that truly need it…”22
While the visa provides relief, it is meant to strategically allow needy migrants to regularize quietly
while excluding many more who would seek to enter.

22

ya se desbordó nuestra capacidad … En este momento hemos decidido solicitar una visa humanitaria que la
proporcionaremos a los hermanos venezolanos que realmente la necesiten” Voice of America Interview, September
24, 2019.
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Another aspect of the VERHU visa is the creation of a census of Venezuelans residing
within Ecuador. As a requirement to apply for the visa and temporary residence, Venezuelans in
Ecuador must submit biometric data online to the “Registro Migratorio de Ciudadanos
Venezolanos en Ecuador.”18 Vice Minister of Human Mobility Carlos Velástegui said at the
Informe Visa VERHU at the national conference ‘XVIII Mesa Nacional de Movilidad Humana’23
in September 2020 that around 67,000 Venezuelans had registered for this registry. This may
signal what we are to see emerge next in Ecuador’s migration regime, though it is too early to tell.
In November 2019, Ecuador’s Minister of the Interior Maria Paula Romo signed an agreement
with the US Ambassador to acquire the PISCES, or Personal Identification Secure Comparison
and Evaluation System, a biometric control database to be installed in airports, borders, and other
points of entry. The technology scans fingerprints, can recognize faces and documents, and,
according to the US Embassy in Quito, documents entries and exits from the country. The
biometric border system represents another act of securitization—border surveillance that may be
wielded in concert with the datafication of Venezuelan migrants.24
One notes that this is not the only ‘ad-hoc’ visa of its kind in the region targeting
Venezuelan migration flows. Chile, Colombia, and Peru have also implemented visas that single
out Venezuelans and restrict their entry, sometimes couched in language of need and for which it
can be difficult to qualify. 25 This regional context is important considering that some scholars
characterize Ecuador’s migration management as one of systematic inaction, allowing migrants in
but quickly shuffling them out again by denying access to regularization, creating “humanitarian
corridors” that transport migrants from the Northern Border to the Southern in one fell swoop
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Visa VERHU Report; XVIII National Table on Human Mobility, carried out in Quito
El Comercio, 2018 and US Embassy in Ecuador Publication, 2018
25
see discussion of Chile’s Visa of Democratic Responsibility in Finn and Reguero, 2020
24
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(Beyers and Nicholls). However, this congruence with neighboring countries makes the visa no
less restrictive, and considering the especially deep protections for migrants in the Constitution
and the importance of migrants in the national narrative, it warrants unique exploration in the
Ecuadorian context.
Examining the VERHU visa in the context of repeated attempts by the Moreno government
to restrict and utilize rights-language as a shield, we can critically understand how the visa
contributes to the state’s evolving migration regime. The visa seemingly accepts the court
challenges to the restrictions put in place by the ministerial agreements and has acted to deal with
the ‘irregular status’ of Venezuelan migrants; the visa allows a path to temporary regularization,
and legal work for those already in the country. However, the visa also decimates the ability of
migrants to enter the country as indicated by the price and logistics of presenting valid passports,
securing apostilled background checks, and completing interviews in only three cities. The public
statement of the Defensoría,26 which litigated multiple times that the Ministerial Agreements were
unconstitutional, offered no challenges to this visa. However the Working Group on Venezuelan
Human Mobility, a collection of thirty-seven organizations (only one based in Ecuador, Misión
Scalabriniana Ecuador) released a statement on the harms of the visa arguing that it violated human
rights obligations (WOLA, 2019).

Criminality and Securitization in Proposed Reforms to the Ley de Movilidad Humana
President Moreno proposed reforms to the Ley de Movilidad Humana (LOMH) in the wake
of the shooting of a north Quito woman by a Venezuelan migrant in February 2020. These reforms
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Defensoría del Pueblo is an autonomous organ of the state that acts as a means of state transparency and
accountability. It is a legal body that has a constitutional mandate to protect human rights of those residing in
Ecuador as well as Ecuadorians living abroad. I also refer to it as the Office of the Ombudsman as its English
translation.
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were initially submitted to the Asemblea Nacional around the same period as the Decreto 826 in
July 2019; however, the Moreno administration used the femicide incident to gain traction on the
reforms. While the text of this document does not address Venezuelans specifically, one must
consider it in the context of the “state of migratory emergency,” and how it adds to the broader
pattern of migration restriction. The original LOMH approved by Ecuador’s Asemblea Nacional
in January 2017; it implemented the migrant-focused protections of the 2008 Constitution and
replaced once and for all the heavy-on-securitization Ley de Extranjería of 1971 (Eguiguren,
2011). To amend this major legislation so quickly after its passage, and under the same ruling party
that proposed and passed it (Correa’s Alianza País), points toward an important shift in the Moreno
administration's migration policy goals.
This document was entitled ‘Proyecto de Ley Orgánica Reformatoria a la Ley Orgánica de
Movilidad Humana, which I will refer to as ‘Reforms to LOMH.’ This legal document includes a
common-person’s explanation of the changes to the legislation, as well as the formal articles. The
legal explanation includes an opening paragraph that celebrates how the Constitution of the
Republic has prioritized the principle of freedom of movement in “completely new” ways, and
that “with time the difference discriminating between nationals and foreigners will be eliminated,
as advocated by the principle of universal citizenship,” (Reforms to LOMH, 2019).27
Despite this rhetorical framing that celebrates Universal Citizenship, the proposed legal
changes to the LOMH would allow for easier deportation procedures in the name of national
security and eliminate the UNASUR visa, with which many Venezuelans entered Ecuador in
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…. Principio con el que el Ecuador se ha posicionado a la vanguardia del enfoque completamente nuevo en las
políticas y la legislación migratoria que, conforme la disposición constitucional, con el tiempo se eliminará la
diferencia discriminatoria entre nacionales y extranjeros, como propugna el principio de ciudadanía universal.
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2018.28 Despite the heavy-handed references to Ecuadorian Constitution’s commitment to radical
human mobility, this document requires that applicants “not be considered a threat or risk to the
internal security of the State,” and that authorities may turn migrants away on the basis of security
risk reports. This language leaves it open to the state to determine who is considered a “threat” or
risk to internal security, and allows this broad judgement to dictate entry and access to
regularization. The state’s decision to turn migrants away without full consideration of their needs
could be seen as violating the principal of non-refoulement, the idea in international customary
law that guarantees no one be returned to a country where they would face torture, loss of life,
cruel and inhuman treatment, etc, something included in Ecuador’s LOMH, as well as several
international treaties.29 The reforms add that “the Ecuadorian state may establish temporary entry
authorization mechanisms for South American citizens in duly necessary cases,” (Article 34 of
Reforms to LOMH, 2019).30 Indeed, Ecuador has since joined the PROSUR (new regional bloc
excluding Venezuela created in March 2019) and expresses support for the Lima Group, a group
of Western Hemisphere countries that have denounced the Maduro government in Venezuela.

Conclusion
This chapter has investigated what policy changes have taken place under the Moreno
administration with regard to Venezuelan ‘migration crisis.’ This chapter has demonstrated a
pattern of legal attempts by the administration to restrict Venezuelan migrants’ entry by imposing
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UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) was formed in 2010 under leadership from the Latin American
Left, including Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa, meant Latin Americans of member countries could enjoy ease of
travel and work across borders, in a scheme similar to the European Union. Moreno announced Ecuador would be
leaving the UNASUR group and asked that its headquarters be moved from Quito on March 13, 2019.
29
Including the UNHCR’s Global Compact on Migration
30
El Estado ecuatoriano podrá establecer mecanismos temporales de autorización de ingreso para ciudadanos
suramericanos ante casos de necesidad debidamente fundamentados.
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additional document requirements in the name of protection. In These ministerial agreements,
Presidential Decree 826, and proposed modifications to the Ley de Movilidad Humana frame
increased surveillance not as contrary to freedom of movement, but as conditions for the
enforcement of migrants’ human rights. Through the Constitutional Court’s provisional
suspension of these policies show that the agreements invoke the same humanitarian clauses they
violate in order to justify their restriction. The ministerial agreements impose arduous new
document requirements, requiring additional proof of identity and an apostilled criminal
background check, not only disproportionately complicating entry through typical means, but
hinging logic on inherent Venezuelan criminality. Interestingly, the VERHU visa contains the
same restraints that were heavily criticized, challenged by the Office of the Ombuds and (at least
temporarily) struck down, but has not been challenged at all presumably because of the path to
regularization it offers. The limited access to interview space favors those already within Ecuador
while completely excluding those outside, and with requirements of registration it imposes its own
form of security, particularly involving biometric securitization. Finally, the third section of this
chapter examined the proposed ‘reforms’ to the LOMH submitted by President Moreno around
the same period, Summer 2019, and argues that this text also invokes Ecuadorian rights-based
exceptionalism while simultaneously shifting towards migration restrictions, easier deportation
and mechanisms of control. In my next chapter, I will show how the Moreno administration’s
discourse around Venezuelan migrants also employs rights-centric language though the reality of
the policies grows increasingly restrictive.
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CHAPTER IV: VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS IN STATE DISCOURSE

Introduction

This chapter examines the political discourse of the Moreno administration regarding
Venezuelan migrants, the policies that seek to govern them, and what this reflects (or seeks to
reflect) about the Ecuadorian state. “Discourse” refers to how language is not benign, static, or
neutral, but actively makes up our world and our understanding, generates “truths,” and tells us
something about the position of those who speak it (Foucault, 1969). Political discourses enable
state actors to construct authoritative representations of national life, national identities, and
resident populations (Foucault, 1969; Wodak, 2002). I analyze how the Moreno administration
uses humanitarian language to talk about vulnerability, suffering, and ultimately the need for order
and restriction.
I conceptualize the Moreno administration as attempting to create through its political
discourse of migration a ‘humanitarian government.’ Defining humanitarian, Fassin draws from
the word’s etymology, referring to both a shared human-ness and a sympathy for suffering, or
humane-ness (Fassin, 2013). Humanitarian government is “the administration of human
collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle which sees the preservation of life and the
alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action” (Fassin, 2007, p. 151). Humanitarian
government attempts to construct a national narrative: “the story that a national collective tells
about itself” (Yadgar, 2002, p. 58; see also Brand, 2010, p. 81).
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In this chapter I argue that the political discourse of migration is dominated by three
mutually-reinforcing images: 1) Venezuelan migrants as victims; 2) that their victimhood derives
from a corrupt and vile Maduro administration; and 3) that they are cared for by Ecuador, a rightscommitted humanitarian state. Venezuelan migrants are relegated to a third figure in a schema that
pits Venezuela against Ecuador. Moreover, Ecuadorian state actors appeal to neutral, overarching
human rights protections and draw legitimacy through participation in transnational organizations
such as the IOM and UNHCR.
I also have identified three major moments of discursive rupture that break from the
dominant humanitarian framing. These three instances are all triggered in the wake of a very
public, violent event. At these moments, the political discourse of the Moreno administration goes
beyond the dominant narrative of Venezuelans as victims and creates a supplementary narrative
of Venezuelans as criminals. Nevertheless, the state still invokes the protection of rights as cause
for order and control, and in wielding rights discourse for another group they demonstrate it is not
the recipient but the constructed humanitarian Ecuadorian state that benefits from this rhetoric.

The Timing of Political Discourse on Venezuelan Migration
Before beginning on an analysis, I would like to note that the Venezuelan migrant crisis
entered the political discourse of the Moreno administration in 2018 as diplomatic relations
between Ecuador and Venezuela were deteriorating. Until mid-2018, there was a palpable lack of
mention in both speeches and the Cancillería31 press statements. The first and only major mention
of the “migrant crisis” in 2017 was President Moreno’s UN General Assembly speech. Moreno
made no mention of Venezuela or Maduro, but placed emphasis on two migration principles: “El
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Cancillería, or chancery, is used interchangeably to mean MREMH
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Ecuador impulsa el principio de ciudadanía universal y libre movilidad, porque estamos cada vez
más interconectados y el derecho a la libre movilidad no puede ser solo para el capital y las
mercancías. … Cerrar las fronteras no es la solución. Nunca lo ha sido, en la historia de la
humanidad.”32 This invocation of the migrant crisis does more work to highlight the uniqueness
and commitment of Ecuador to their migrant-rights principles than to speak to the situation facing
Venezuelan migrants.
The lack of publications regarding Venezuela migrants in the first year of the Moreno
administration is striking. In 2017, even as Venezuelans continued to enter at higher rates, the
Cancillería released no press statements. It was not until June 2018 that there was first mention of
“venezolanos” by the Cancillería. The next mention is in August 2018, with the declaration of the
state of migratory emergency discussed in my last chapter. The official Cancillería Twitter
account, which would go on to mention Venezuelans literally hundreds of times in the following
years, did not tweet about them between 2016 and 2018, and Lenín Moreno’s Twitter account did
not mention Venezuelans or Venezuelan migrants until August 16, 2018, a week after the
declaration of the migratory emergency. I suggest that up until this time, the Moreno
administration hesitated to diverge from its public commitments to Universal Citizenship
reaffirmed at the UN in 2017, but ultimately determined a policy that would allow focus on
migrants’ rights and serve an interest in migrant restriction.
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Ecuador encourages the principles of universal citizenship and free movement, because we are more connected
every day and the right to free movement cannot only be for capital and merchandise … Closing borders is not the
solution. It never has been, in all of human history.
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Ecuadorian Generosity and the Construction of the Humanitarian State
The previous chapter shows that Ecuador pursued increasing restrictions on Venezuelan
migrants through legal and bureaucratic channels. This chapter demonstrates that Ecuadorian state
actors have simultaneously presented a welcoming rhetoric that employs kinship terms and
inviting imagery. This political discourse draws parallels to Ecuadorian migrant identity in ways
that reinforce the projection of Ecuador as a “country of migrants” dedicated to human rights.
State actors signal at least performative support for Venezuelans in public forums. The
phrase “hermanos venezolanos,”33 runs throughout the informal materials, including many tweets
and speeches. Hermano as a phrase of endearment is not reserved only for Venezuelan migrants.;
Moreno has employed it in various speeches to denote solidarity and kinship with target
populations. In his 2019 address to the nation, for example, Moreno made reference to coastal,
uniformed, and indigenous hermanos, in addition to Venezuelan migrants. Interestingly, while
ostensibly a term of endearment and solidarity, the fact that it is assigned to specialty groups within
Ecuador places Venezuelan migrants in this same ‘token group’ category as veritable Ecuadorians.
Another phrase invoked by the Moreno administration is the metaphor of receiving
Venezuelan migrants “with open arms.” The metaphor, too, of open arms is a comforting one,
based in the body, and the language works to humanize the state. Considering the fear of foreign
penetration of the metaphorical sovereign body politic (Bigo, 2002), the ‘open arms’ motif
provides the contrast of welcome. This phrase intersects with Domenech’s (2013) assertion that
modern migration management involves ‘control with a human face.’ This phrase is often used in
the past tense as a sweeping generalization of Ecuador’s acceptance of migrants, and allows the
state to create an image of welcome that erases the complex reality of restrictions and ministerial
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literally “Venezuelan brothers;” evokes brotherhood
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agreements. In response to the Venezuelan elections in January 2019, Moreno said in a public
statement: “Por ser solidarios, por recibir con los brazos abiertos a nuestros hermanos venezolanos,
por compartir territorio, empleo, educación y salud… recibimos gratuitamente injurias, vertidas
por una autoridad oficial, que nos llevaron a retirar a nuestro embajador en Caracas.”34 Ecuador
has opened its arms, received Venezuelans, and in return received criticisms; this language and
framing allows Ecuador to appear morally correct in its foreign policy approach. 35 This framing
relies on the binary of welcoming giver and the corrupt Venezuela.
Statistics highlighting the scale of Venezuelan migration are included in speaking
engagements and tweets. Emphasis on the sheer number of migrants is repeated partially because
the statistics are always evolving, and also because the state sought to emphasize the extreme
numbers of migrants crossing and Ecuador’s strain to accommodate them. In speeches before the
UN General Assembly and the Ecuadorian nation, respectively, Lenín Moreno has said “En
Ecuador estamos recibiendo diariamente a al menos seis mil hermanos venezolanos”36; and “Según
las Naciones Unidas, los migrantes venezolanos en Ecuador llegarán a fin de año –¡oíganme bien!–
a 500 mil, una cifra que ya supera en mucho nuestra capacidad de acogida.”37 These figures of
6000 daily arrivals and 500,000 migrants by the end of the year are meant to shock the Ecuadorian
public. This was invoked invoked to discuss the suspension of the ministerial agreements—
“suspendió el requisito del pasado judicial para los ciudadanos venezolanos, pasamos de 500, a
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For being supportive, for receiving with open arms our Venezuelan brothers, for sharing territory, work,
education, and health… we receive unfounded insults, spilled by an official authority, which forced us to withdraw
our ambassador to Caracas.
35
Like the usage of “hermanos venezolanos,” this phrase is not reserved exclusively for Venezuelan migrants, it is
also addressed frequently to Ecuadorian migrants of the diaspora in appeals to return when they are ready. A
September 2019 tweet by Moreno bids, “¡Los esperamos siempre, con los brazos abiertos!” | “Forever waiting for
you, with open arms!”
36
In Ecuador we are receiving at least six thousand Venezuelan brothers daily. | Moreno 2018, UN Speech
37
According to the United Nations, the number of Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador will rise to be -- hear me well! -500 thousand, a statistic that already far exceeds our capacity as hosts. | Moreno 2019, Guayaquil Speech
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2.500 ingresos diarios.”38 The numbers provide jarring imagery of an extreme migrant crisis and
the extreme generosity of Ecuador. Citing the UN and the IOM provides legitimacy to the figures
and aligns Ecuador with the broader global migration regime (Domenech 2017).
In discussing Venezuelan migrants, the administration’s speeches and tweets often portray
them victims of an enormous crisis. Sometimes these political texts are left ambiguous; for
example, the phrase “forced to move by the largest migration crisis of our time,” for example,
emphasizes severity but without any particular name. Moreno administration discourse often
draws attention to the downtrodden image of migrants whose situation is described alongside the
condemnations of the Maduro regime in Venezuela. The two create a mutually reinforcing
narrative: migrants vulnerable because of the “tyrannical regime” of Maduro. This allows Ecuador
to assume the position of benevolent state with strong human rights commitments while painting
Venezuela as inhumane and corrupt.
Medical treatment takes on a special role in the rhetoric around Venezuelan suffering and
Ecuadorian generosity. In a September 2018 interview with television station Ecuavisa’s morning
program “Políticamente Correcto,” Minister Jose Valencia used medical aid to shift emphasis from
the restrictions and requirements of documents, instead bringing attention to the medical care
provided by the state: “... Porque [la migración masiva de venezolanos] no solamente se refiere a
temas de identificación, de cruce de fronteras con documentos, sino también cuestiones de salud
pública, de protección a personas vulnerables…”39 This broadens and redirects focus on the role
of the Ecuadorian state, from a state role of restriction to one of protection. This effort to shift from
the perception of the state controlling to providing services and meeting humanitarian needs
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“Suspended the background check for the Venezuelan citizens, we went from 500 to 2,500 entries a day. | Moreno
2019, Guayaquil Speech
39
… Because [the mass migration of Venezuelans] doesn’t only refer to things like identification, crossing borders
with documents, but also issues of public health, of protecting the vulnerable...
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reflects the construction of Ecuador as a ‘humanitarian state;’ (Fassin, 2005; Domenech, 2013).
Later in the same interview, Valencia again brings attention to medical care for Venezuelan
children entering the country: “La acción del estado ecuatoriano no se ha restringido solamente en
verificar los documentos de ingreso. También, ha habido un trabajo del ministerio de salud pública,
de 25 mil dosis de vacunación se han dado, se han impartido a los menores venezolanos.”40 Here,
Valencia asks the public to redefine the role of the state in their collective imagination, to think of
the state and migration not in terms of restriction, bureaucrats and visas, apostilled background
checks, and armed border control, but also of the condition of the humans who cross, and the state
as their caretaker and nurturer. In reality, while both may be true, the control measures do not
evaporate; Valencia does not deny that these measures of control do exist, but he asks that one
direct attention instead to more palatable aspects. This exemplifies the migration management idea
of a dual reality, one in which humanitarian ideas do not replace securitizing policy, but in which
the two are interwoven (Magliano & Clavijo, 2011; Domenech, 2013).
Similarly, in his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2018, Lenín Moreno
drew attention to the health issues of Venezuelans arriving in Ecuador, saying, “Los niños llegan
con sarampión, con difteria, con poliomielitis; mujeres embarazadas que nunca se han hecho un
control … Hemos destinado más de 50 mil vacunas para esos bellos e indefensos niños.”41 There
is a choice here to mention women and children, and a choice to speak of Venezuelans as
profoundly weak and sick. Perhaps it is first salient to contrast this with outwardly securitist
language, that might invoke illness as disease and speak of them bringing waste or illness to the
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The actions of the Ecuadorian state hasn’t been restricted only to verifying entry documents. It also has been a
task of the ministry of public health, they have distributed, they have given 25 thousand vaccination doses to
Venezuelan minors.
41
The children arrive with measles, with diphtheria, with polio; pregnant women who have never had pre-natal care,
… We have set aside 50 thousand vaccines for these beautiful and defenseless children.
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Ecuadorian state. Instead, Moreno emphasizes their vulnerability and need for medical care. This
description is in line with characterizations of Venezuelan migrants as laid low by the Maduro
regime. his weakness both demonizes the conditions of Venezuela (women who have never had a
prenatal care, diseased children— reflecting symbolically and literally on the withered health of
the Venezuelan state) and allows Ecuador to play the hero, demonstrate not only generosity and
commitment to human rights, but also showcase the strength of Ecuadorian medical institutions.42
Fassin (2005) and Ticktin’s (2011) work on humanitarian migration policies would argue that
physically suffering bodies are recognized by the state as “morally legitimate” in ways that other
migrants’ bodies are not.

“Íbamos a ser Venezuela”
The Moreno administration’s political discourse of migration is not just limited to positive
representations of themselves as creating a humanitarian state. From 2018 and onwards,
administration discourse vehemently denounced the Maduro administration. In the 2019 UN
General Assembly speech, Moreno refers to Venezuelans as “víctimas de [un] conflicto” caused
by an irresponsible government. In the same speech, he declared: “Nadie abandona la tierra amada,
nadie abandona los familiares, nadie abandona a los amigos por voluntad propia. Lo hacen porque
son obligados por una diáspora de un gobierno despótico y carente de humanismo.”43 In the
Guayaquil 2019 speech, Moreno remarked that the five million people leaving Venezuela as
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For context, Ecuador’s health system includes both a public and private sector with many public hospitals, and
per Article 32 of the 2008 Constitution, health is a right guaranteed by the state to all Ecuadorians and foreigners in
Ecuador.
43
No one abandons their beloved land, no one abandons their families, no one abandons their friends voluntarily.
They do it because they are obligated by a despotic and inhuman government.
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migrants were the ultimate sacrifice of a people, but a relief for the oppressor.44 Here, Venezuelans
are represented as victims, and specifically victims of the ‘despotic’ Maduro regime.
However, the rhetoric used to describe Venezuelans still does not trigger actual legal
protection status. Considering the extensive protections listed in normative law, this invocation of
moral obligation should guarantee Venezuelans the rights afforded to refugees, as Ecuador is party
to the Cartagena Declaration’s broad definition of the refugee that includes generalized violence.
Each year as Ecuador’s MREMH formally recognizes the UN “Day of the Refugee,” with speeches
and press announcements speaking on the issues facing refugees and highlighting Ecuador’s
human rights commitments. Ministry officials do not shy away from referring to Venezuelan
migrants and including them in discussions of refugee care. Moreno has used the word “refugee”
to describe them before (“los migrantes, los desplazados y los refugiados venezolanos”).45
However, there is no prima-facie or “at first sight” legal protection, that is, despite referring to
Venezuelan migrants’ dire realities and sometimes including them in speeches honoring refugees,
there is no inherent protection for Venezuelans as refugees simply by reason of being from
Venezuela and a part of a group fleeing an economic and social crisis. At the time of writing, only
Brazil has instituted a prima-facie protection for Venezuelans (Acosta & Madrid, 2020). By
utilizing affirmative language about refugee protection but in practice restricting access to the
country, the Moreno administration leverages their image and their suffering for political gain. The
gap between the emotional reaction evoked with the language of “refugee” and the lack of any real
legal protections that accompany that word and this framing exemplifies how language benefits
the state’s need as defined by the Moreno administration.
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No puede haber un sacrificio tan grande de un pueblo, que obligue a emigrar a más de 5 millones de ciudadanos.
Y por supuesto, el hecho de que se vayan al exilio representa, sin duda alguna, un alivio para el opresor. | Moreno
2019, Guayaquil Speech
45
The Venezuelan migrants, displaced, and refugees | Moreno 2018, UN Speech
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Moreno extrapolates the moral corruption of Venezuela to create its opposite: a generous
Ecuador. But administration rhetoric also uses imagery of Venezuelan suffering to reflect the
‘evils’ of the Maduro economic policies. We see this exemplified in part of the speech at Guayaquil
Founding Day in 2019, the first time that the VERHU visa was announced:
Compatriotas: cada vez que veamos a un hermano venezolano procurando subsistir,
tratando de alimentar a su familia, ¡no olvidemos que íbamos por ese camino! ¡Allá íbamos,
allá íbamos! ¡En buena hora lo evitamos! Íbamos a ser Venezuela. Y no podemos volver
¡nunca más! a ese punto de irresponsabilidad, de derroche, de descomposición, de
corrupción y de decadencia. No olvidemos que ese es el resultado indiscutible de la
demagogia, del autoritarismo, del populismo. ¡Ese era el mal llamado socialismo del siglo
21! Cerca estuvimos de estar nosotros también migrando, pero no sucedió.46
This sentiment is clear: migrants are the real-life example of failed “socialist policies” to be held
up as a warning to Ecuadorian audiences. One should fear the outcome of Venezuela and respect
the authority and direction of President Moreno, who seeks to lead the country down a different
path to avoid authoritarianism, populism, and waste (all descriptions Moreno has levied against
Correa at various times in recent years). In this way, Moreno utilizes the platform of migration to
bring to the fore other interests of his administration, that is, to maintain electoral support for the
hard road of austerity that will purge the country of its former socialist excesses and rejoin the
international community by embracing neoliberal economic policies.
Venezuelan suffering is a political resource that is used by the Moreno administration to
frame the Ecuadorian state as a caring, benevolent force. Imagery of Venezuelans as oppressed,
fighting to merely survive and feed their family, serves to further not only the pity of the
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Compatriots: every time we see a Venezuelan brother trying to survive, trying to feed his family, let us not forget
that we were headed down that road! We were going, we were going that way! We avoided it just in time! We were
going to be Venezuela. And we cannot ever return to that point of irresponsibility, of waste, of decomposition, of
corruption and of decadence. We cannot forget that this is the indisputable result of demagogy, of authoritarianism,
of populism. That was the misnamed twenty-first century socialism! / We were close to migrating ourselves, but it
didn’t come to pass.
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Ecuadorian audience, but to create a dichotomy and a counterfactual: what Ecuador is; what
Venezuela is; and what Ecuador could have been. Migrants and their suffering are used to construct
Maduro’s corrupt, despotic, socialist state in contrast to Moreno’s humanitarian state.

Ecuador as Country of Migrants: The Roots of Humanitarian Migration Policy
Another theme that emerges on Venezuelan migrants is the relation to Ecuadorian migration, and
how state actors were on several occasions invoking their own ‘migration history’ in relation to
Venezuelans. As discussed earlier, the Ecuadorian mass emigration of the early 2000s had a
profound impact on the way migrants were afforded rights in the 2008 Constitution, though much
of it was aspirational (Margheritis, 2011). How is the memory of this Ecuadorian diaspora present,
here, with regard to Venezuelans? Ecuadorian officials, in particular Carlos Velástegui, Vice
Minister of Human Mobility, utilized memory of the “Ecuadorian migration experience” as 1)
another way to underscore the humanitarian commitment to migrants and generosity, constructed
as ‘inherent’ and 2) a way to justify controls and additional sovereignty measures. Overall, it
contributes to the construction of the image of the humanitarian state with “a human face” while
masking or defending restrictive policies.
Vice Minister Carlos Alberto Velástegui has made explicit the framing of the Ecuadorian
state as generous, and often makes reference to the ‘experience’ that led to these policies.
Presenting a report on the VERHU visa in September 2020, he remarked that the Ecuadorian state
“es un estado generoso, es un estado hospitalario, es un estados de brazos abiertos. Ha sido parte
de nuestra política pública, esta concepción respecto de la movilidad humana, reflejo de las
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realidades que pasan nuestros propios ciudadanos ecuatorianos en otros países del mundo … ”47
This language firmly connects a generous, hospitable state, and an inherent respect for human
mobility reflected in policy. Velástegui articulates this connection again on World Refugee Day,
June 2020, saying that Ecuador has a very ‘unique’ characteristic of openness based in profound
empathy for those foreigners that come to Ecuador, and attributing this to the Ecuadorian diaspora
experience: “Es decir, la característica intrínseca del ser humano y eso está ligado a nuestra
historia. Nosotros tenemos también una historia que nos complementa, tenemos ciudadanos cerca
de dos millones de compatriotas afuera que probablemente han pasado similares penurias en
cuando a la llegada a un país…”48 Invoking the two-million Ecuadorians abroad as the root of an
intrinsically human centered public policy shows that Ecuador’s own migration experience has
permeated a national history. The portrayal of Ecuador as a state impacted by migration and
inherently open furthers its image as a humanitarian state in the public imagination.
In an interview discussing the VERHU visa and regularization for Venezuelans in Ecuador,
Vice Minister Velástegui contextualized the topic of migration by bringing up the current
1,700,000 Ecuadorians living abroad, and using equalizing language: “al igual a los
venezolanos…” he says, "...en cualquier condición que el ciudadano extranjero debe respetar y
cumplir con la normativa ecuatoriana, con la ley — el ciudadano que delinque es un ciudadano
que no es bienvenido en cualquier sociedad."49 He uses universal language that avoids generalizing
Venezuelans as violent, instead drawing comparisons with Ecuadorians. At the same time, his
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is a generous state, a hospitable state, it is a state with open arms. It has been part of our public policy, this
understanding of respect for human mobility, reflecting the realities of our own Ecuadorian citizens in other
countries of the world…
48
That is to say, the intrinsic characteristic of being a human being and that is tied to our history. We also have a
history that compliments us, we have close to two million compatriots out there that probably have gone through
similar hardships in arriving to a country ...
49
... no matter their [migratory] status the foreign citizen should respect and comply with the regulations of
Ecuador, with the law -- a citizen that commits crime is a citizen that is not welcome in any society.
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invocation of Ecuadorians also serves to reinforce sovereignty and underscore the need to follow
the approved laws and regulations. In another interview, Velástegui presents the Ecuadorian
experience to help explain the power of another country50 saying when an Ecuadorian is abroad,
this person must follow the sovereignty of that country, and while Ecuador would hope they allow
regularization to the Ecuadorian, each country acts within their own norms and laws.51
Additionally, Additionally, we see repeated calls to emphasize the actions of Ecuador as a
leader in the Venezuelan crisis, particularly emphasizing the Quito Process and the Human
Mobility Technical Tables Meetings, a regional and national meetings instigated by the Ecuadorian
government and hosted in Quito to discuss policy and action on the Venezuelan migrant crisis. 52
State actors are quick to point out that Ecuador is one of only a few countries that have signed all
international human rights covenants, including the UN World Migration Pact.53

Discursive Ruptures: Criticisms of Migrants beyond Humanitarian Framing
There are a few major divergences from the dominant political discourse of benevolencecentered rhetoric pertaining to Venezuelan migrants. Three distinct moments of criminalizing talk
emerge, all after major disruptive events. These discursive ruptures present a criminal Venezuelan
migrant. However, this criminalizing discourse operates within an encompassing political space
that seeks to preserve an innocent victim migrant to be protected.
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“sabemos nuestro propio realidad, solo para darle un comparativo” | “We know our own experience, just to give
you a point of comparison.”
51
Velástegui, 2020, Notihoy entrevista on FBlive
52
UN 2019 Moreno Speech; UN Event 2019 Jose Valencia; 18th mesa nacional de movilidad humana Jose
Valencia.
53
Jose Valencia National Mesa of Human Mobility Aug 31, 2020; Carlos Velástegui Aug 31, 2020; Carlos
Velástegui World Refugee Day June 19, 2020.
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During the protests of October 2019, a series of violent conflicts between the national
police and protesters from transportation unions and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities
of Ecuador (CONAIE), Venezuelans were one of several outside groups faulted for the unrest. On
October 15, a few days after the last day of protests, President Moreno gave a speech that pointed
to various foreign infiltrators, including FARC and ELN of Colombia,54 “secuestradores
correístas,”55 and Venezuelan migrants. However, not all Venezuelan migrants were implicated in
this “guerra de guerrillas,” according to Moreno, who creates a dual narrative of “good” and “bad”
migrants. “Estuvieron aquí centenas de venezolanos que se filtraron con la gente buena. Se filtraron
con los venezolanos que huyen de un régimen despótico que ahora también martiriza a los
ecuatorianos, y ha martirizado y ha dejado en el hambre, en la desesperación y con carencias a ese
pobre pueblo.”56 We see here a distinction between Venezuelans who are victims of the Maduro
regime and those, in the eyes of the state, co-opted that experience and that opportunity to infiltrate
Ecuador. Even while pointing to infiltrators and implied criminals, bad among the good, there
remains the narrative of the victim-Venezuelan to serve as foil.
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FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) are two leftwing armed guerilla groups operating in Colombia since the 1960s.
55
“Correa-supporting hijackers”
56
There were hundreds of Venezuelans here who filtered through with the good people. They filtered through with
the Venezuelans who fled a tyrannical regime and which now martyrs Ecuadorians, and has martyred and left this
poor people hungry, desperate, and with scarcity.
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Figure 1: “We Are All Diana!” Statement Published on official Lenín Moreno Twitter Account 57

The second instance is perhaps the most infamous of the rhetoric surrounding the
Ecuadorian response to Venezuelans. In late January 2019, a pregnant young woman in Ibarra, a
city in the northern region of Imbabura, was held hostage by her Venezuelan boyfriend at knifepoint for nearly an hour and murdered in plain view of police. Her death riled the country and led
to a deluge of xenophobic attacks in the city of Ibarra, forcing migrants to flee the city.
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Figure 1 Translation: We are all Diana! Ecuador is and will always be a country of peace. I will not permit a oneoff loner to snatch that away from us. The integrity of our mothers, daughters and female companions is my priority.
I have arranged for the immediate formation of brigades to control the legal situation of Venezuelan immigrants in
the streets, in places of work, and at the borders. We are analyzing the possibility of creating a special permit to
enter the country. We have opened the doors to them, but we will not sacrifice the security of anyone. It is the
responsibility of the police to take decisive action against crime and delinquency, and they have my backing. We
will apply the full weight of the law to those who did nothing in the face of violence, injustice and the criminal
exercise of power.
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International news coverage focused on the statement that President Moreno released that night
via his Twitter account; in it, Moreno called for control, security and proposed the idea of a special
entry permit for the country.
With the use of the phrase “Todos somos Diana” (see Figure 1), Moreno Moreno co-opts
the rallying cry of a feminist anti-gendered-violence movement in an attempt to align himself with
another vulnerable group’s expression for rights.58 The word “integridad” is interesting here in the
context of women’s safety; at once it evokes not only physical integrity but implies a spiritual and
sexual wholeness of the mothers, daughters, and compañeras. Here, though, violence against
women is indeed an issue in Ecuador and Diana Carolina’s death was tragic., Moreno extrapolates
this incident to the much broader national level, calling on brigades to “control the legal situation
of Vvenezuelan immigrants in the streets, in places of work and at the border,” invoking the need
for security and order. It is in this context of danger, need for order and security, that the “idea of
a special permit to enter the country” is introduced, though the Moreno administration had already
been introducing restrictions and background checks before this without this specific justification.
When women’s interests are perceived to be at risk, the rhetoric aligns to fight for rights, but now
for another group other than migrants.
In the wake of this event, Communications Minister Andres Michelena tweeted, “Tenemos
conocimiento de la estrategia de Maduro. No podemos tolerar que envíe a personas que tiene
detenidas en sus cárceles al Ecuador, por eso rechaza la entrega de récord judicial. No podemos
generalizar, hay hermanos venezolanos queridos y de gran valor.”59 Mechelena asserts that the
bodies being sent into Ecuador are inherently criminal, and that a failure to submit to the
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This phrase, using “Todos Somos,” or “we are all” and the name of the deceased, is used frequently to call
attention to femicides throughout Latin America.
59
We know Maduro’s strategy. We cannot allow him to send his prison detainees to Ecuador, this is why he rejects
submitting penal records. We cannot generalize, there are dear Venezuelan brothers and sisters of great value.
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confessionary of the visa process and its criminal record is a conscious decision to trick and harm.
In the same tweet, a quick turn tacks on that though it is a strategy of Maduro (again pinning direct
effect to mastermind cause agent), there are some ‘queridos’ Venezuelans. The fact that these two
frames exist within the same tweet60 demonstrates a kind of discursive ambivalence. There is no
racial or defining distinction for “good” and “bad” Venezuelans, those streaming in from prison
or walking hundreds of miles with diseases. Their identity takes the shape of the needs of the state
in constructing them, and while it seems in large part the rhetoric has trended towards the
humanitarian to justify restriction, there is another side that may be invoked when useful.
Almost exactly a year after the Ibarra femicide, another public death of an Ecuadorian
woman triggered speech justifying restriction in February 2020. A sixty-eight year old woman
named Maria Granja was shot by a young Venezuelan migrant outside of a shopping mall in the
affluent northern district of Quito. In the wake of her death, both President Moreno and Minister
of the Interior Maria Paula Romo used the incident to call the Asemblea Nacional to pass the
proposed reforms to the Ley de Movilidad Humana (LOMH) discussed in the previous chapter,
and another piece of legislation on security. In his language, Moreno argued the reforms would
continue to protect the rights of the migrants, the receiving community, and also permit the state
to expel and deport “the foreigners who come to our country to commit crimes.” Framing the
binary as criminals and tourists, he included that those who come to visit or come to “gozar de las
maravillas” are always welcome, but those who “vienen a dañar nuestra sociedad, a asesinar, a
delinquir, a hacer crimen organizado, no, ellos no son bienvenidos.”61
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It should be noted this tweet is in reference to an interview given to Radiocity that unfortunately does not exist
online.
61
“Enjoy the wonders” | “come to harm our society, to murder, to commit crimes, to participate in organized crime,
no, they are not welcome”
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This incident is unique of the three, though, in that it does not draw particular attention to
Venezuelans, rather, it only uses the language of criminality. Unlike other discourse surrounding
migrants we have examined, this in theory extends to other “undesirable” migrant groups, such as
Cubans. On the other hand, given the national discussion around migration, the on-going technical
planning meetings, the migratory state of emergency still being in effect at this time, it did not
have to be explicitly said for Ecuadorians to understand this speech as an extension of the discourse
on Venezuelans and criminality.
Through these three cases, we have seen that the official discourse on Venezuelan migrants
is allowed to differ from the largely dominant humanitarian-centered language only in times of
violence. However, even when there is criminalizing language, there is room left open to preserve
the image of an innocent Venezuelan migrant to still capitalize off of the victim narrative.
Interestingly, nothing is offered in the rhetoric to make a distinction between the two types of
migrant, good or bad. The fluidity of this language allows for an evolving restriction; it is left up
to the state to distinguish and set the terms of what exactly violates safety, and who is considered
a threat.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the political discourse of the Moreno administration regarding
Venezuelan migrants. This portrayal of migrants fits what other scholars have identified as
“migration management,” that is, the use of humanitarian logics in the name of safety and order to
justify controls on bodies and international movement (Domenech 2017). In contrast to
constructions of a racialized or criminal ‘other’ that is seen in some securitization discourse around
migrants, these state actors portray Venezuelan migrants as victims, allowing the Moreno
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administration to adopt the appearance of a “humanitarian state,” that seeks to aid the vulnerable
by using kinship language, stressing the medical need of migrants, and the portrayal of the Maduro
regime as a perpetrator of suffering. Additionally, the Venezuelan migrant discourse has several
times invoked the Ecuadorian mass migration of the early 2000s. In this way, Ecuadorian migrants
continue to play a part in the national narrative of Ecuador as a rights-centered, progressive
country, as the ultimate proof of an innately humanitarian interest embedded in state migration
policies. Memory of Ecuadorian migrants has been used to frame and further the idea of state
sovereignty, reminding of the realities of control and power for migrant bodies in countries. When
breaking from this discourse in moments of extreme distress, blame is shifted to Venezuelans and
there are calls for order, and the dual construction of a “good” and “bad” migrant, one that is the
victim (preserving the dominant narrative) and one that is infiltrating under the orders of the
Maduro administration, an extension of a corrupt foreign power that represents not only Venezuela
but the economic threat of the “socialism of the 21st century.”
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to explore the Moreno administration’s evolving legal actions and
discursive representation of Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador. Chapter 3 establishes that the
Moreno administration repeatedly attempted to limit Venezuelan entry through a series of identity
and bureaucratic requirements, the imposition of a humanitarian visa, and proposed reforms to the
recently established migration legislation, the Ley de Movilidad Humana, which would allow
refoulement and deportation on security grounds. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the political
discourse of the administration concerning migration lauded Ecuador as progressive, benevolent,
and generous; it portrayed Ecuador as a ‘humanitarian state.’ By presenting care rather than
security as the state’s primary interest, the Moreno administration attempted to legitimize its legal
and policy changes. This reflects the logic of “control in order to protect” similar to what one finds
in anti-human trafficking campaigns (Ausserer, 2008; Ruiz and Álvarez, 2019).
The Ecuadorian humanitarian state emerged in opposition to the Venezuelan state and
reaffirmed the legacy of the Ecuadorian diaspora. To bolster the image of Ecuadorian benevolence,
the Moreno administration represented Venezuelan migrants as suffering victims in need of aid.
The Moreno administration also framed the Venezuelan state as a despotic, corrupt, “twenty-first
century socialist” regime that serves as antithesis to Moreno’s increasingly neoliberal Ecuadorian
state. Administration officials also called upon Ecuador’s own migration history, the so-called
“Ecuadorian diaspora” two-million strong, to present Ecuador’s public policy as inherently
migrant-centered and humane because of this ‘unique’ experience. In rare moments, there were
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discursive ruptures from the dominant humanitarian discourse of care for vulnerable Venezuelan
migrants. Even in instances of criminalizing language, some migrants were deemed ‘infiltrators’
while others were preserved as victims in need of protection. This maintained the idea of
Ecuadorian state benevolence.
Based on this empirical analysis, I have argued that the Moreno administration has
centrally pursued the construction of a ‘humanitarian state’ in Ecuador that is built upon a political
discourse of care for the vulnerable and increasingly restrictive legal measures to slow Venezuelan
migration. This allows the Moreno administration to retain the political capital that accompanies
perceptions of the Ecuadorian state as committed to the values of human rights, while quietly
working to implement restrictive policies in the name of protection. As noted by scholars in
literature on migration management, humanitarian language provides a cover through which
restrictive policies can be palatable, but with the same goals as securitization: the efficient control
and order of desirable and undesirable migration flows (Domenech 2013; Fassin 2010; Geiger and
Pécoud 2020).
This work describes shifts towards migration restrictions couched in humanitarian
language and considers the Ecuadorian context under the Lenín Moreno administration (20172021). In Ecuador, there were profound migrant protections already enshrined in law under the
previous Correa administration (2007-2017). This thesis is a valuable addition to scholarship on
migration management as it provides an empirical case of what Domenech (2013; 2017), Scheel
and Ratfish (2014), and Ashutosh and Mountz (2011) have explored theoretically. This thesis also
adds more generally to literature on South American governments’ responses to Venezuelan
migrants, and on discursive governance by presenting empirical findings of the case of Ecuador’s
policy and discourse. The insights of this thesis aid in the scholars’ understanding of responses to
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the Venezuelan migrant crisis, a topic of extreme importance that will continue to affect the region
and millions of people for decades to come. I hope that this thesis adds insight to a small part to
the much larger tapestry of policies around this issue.
In terms of future lines of research, it will be critical to study the full effects of COVID-19
on the border regimes of Latin America, particularly with respect to necropolitics and biopower.
Continuing what has been seen in this paper around characterizations of medical and economic
vulnerability, it will be interesting to see how Venezuelans fit into national narratives around
health, safety and borders in the context of the pandemic— if they continue to be framed as victims,
are converted to “bio-invaders,” or simply are determined to be outside the capacity of the state.
Furthermore, in future research I would like to examine the ‘datification’ of migrants, migrants’
privacy protections, and biometric controls through a biopower lens in Ecuador as the country
slowly implements new technologies of tracking and transnational surveillance, as seen by the
biometric registry required for the VERHU visa and the purchase of PISCES, or Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System.62
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